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I. Introduction
“It’s an unusual role where you have veto power
over the audit committee chairman and over the CEO.”1
Statement of WorldCom’s Corporate Monitor
The WorldCom2 securities fraud led to numerous lawsuits, several criminal convictions,
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. It also led to a novel SEC remedy, which significantly
increases the enforcement power of the Securities and Exchange Commission. In the WorldCom
enforcement action, the SEC sought, and obtained, the judicial appointment of a “Corporate
Monitor.” By the time the Corporate Monitor’s work was done – about two and half years later
– he had caused the company to completely overhaul its corporate governance and to adopt
several unique governance provisions. He had also exercised oversight over all major business
decisions, including the sale of the company to Verizon. Put simply, his primary responsibility
was to ensure that this company would not commit securities fraud ever again.
1

See Joann S. Lublin & Shawn Young, Even as MCI Makes Strides, Monitor Stays, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2004, at
B-1.
2

Following the scandal, WorldCom was renamed MCI, Inc. and was eventually acquired by Verizon, Inc. For ease
of reference, this article refers to the company by its original name, WorldCom.

The Corporate Monitor is something new in corporate and securities law, and it
represents the latest example of the SEC seeking to shift its enforcement responsibilities to the
public companies it regulates.3 In this article, I explore this method of SEC outsourcing. In Part
II of this paper, I briefly discuss the SEC’s enforcement powers, including the use of ancillary
relief in judicial enforcement actions. In Part III, I review the role of WorldCom’s Corporate
Monitor, beginning with his initial appointment and tracing the evolution of his authority at the
company. In particular, I discuss the corporate governance changes that were imposed by the
Corporate Monitor, as well as his extended oversight of the company.
In Part IV, I consider some of the dangers of the SEC’s use of the Corporate Monitor in
its enforcement actions. I discuss the potential of a de facto expansion of the Corporate
Monitor’s power, beyond the power authority defined in the court orders. I also consider the
danger that a Corporate Monitor with far-reaching powers will interfere with the ability of a
board and corporate officers to effectively manage the company. I point out that the appointment
of a Corporate Monitor – who is accountable only to the court – raises interesting issues of
corporate law, and I analyze whether the use of a Corporate Monitor conflicts with state
corporate law. I then consider whether this latest form of ancillary relief constitutes

3

The SEC has sought the Corporate Monitor remedy in several other cases. See, e.g., SEC v. Spear & Jackson,
Litigation Release No. 18668 (Apr. 16, 2004) (seeking a Corporate Monitor “to oversee” the company’s affairs);
SEC v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18551 (Jan. 21, 2004) (seeking a Special Monitor “to protect the
interests of Hollinger International shareholders”); SEC v. U.S. Technologies, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18031
(Mar. 12, 2003) (seeking the appointment of a Corporate Monitor “to review and approve [the company’s] future
disbursements and corporate actions”). In addition, the SEC has recently indicated that it might seek a Corporate
Monitor in a potential action against DHB Industries, Inc. See DHB Industries, Inc. Form 8-K (May 25, 2006)
(disclosing that the SEC had notified the company that it was considering instituting an enforcement action ).
Corporate Monitors have also been sought in criminal cases, especially through deferred prosecution agreements.
See, e.g., David A. Vise, AOL Settlement Includes Tight Controls, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2004, at E05 (noting that
AOL agreed to hire a Corporate Monitor).

2

impermissible overreaching of the SEC’s enforcement powers. In Part V, I conclude by
recommending that the SEC should seek an appointment of a Corporate Monitor only in very
rare cases and should publish guidance explaining when it will seek this ancillary remedy.
Similarly, I recommend that courts should articulate clear judicial standards that must be met
before granting this extraordinary remedy, and I offer a suggested judicial standard. Under this
standard, a court should appoint a Corporate Monitor only if the danger that a company will not
comply with a court order to obey the federal securities laws outweighs the significant dangers
associated with the use of a Corporate Monitor.
II. SEC Enforcement Proceedings and Ancillary Remedies
A.

SEC Enforcement Proceedings
Section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 empowers the SEC to seek

injunctive relief in federal district whenever it appears that “any person is engaged or is about to
engage in any acts or practices constituting a violation” of the federal securities laws.4 To obtain
the injunction, the SEC must show that there is a “reasonable likelihood” of future violations of
the federal securities laws.5 When a court issues the injunction, it is required to briefly explain
the reasons underlying the order.6
4

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C, § 78u(d). For a good discussion of the SEC’s use of the
injunction, see Daniel J. Morrissey, SEC Injunctions, 68 TENN. L. REV. 427 (2001).

5

See MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, 25 SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT §
5:5 (stating that “the test applied in practically all federal courts is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the
defendant, if not enjoined, will again engage in the violative conduct”).

6

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that:
Every order granting on injunction . . . shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific
in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is

3

In addition to an injunction, the SEC is also expressly empowered to seek monetary
penalties,7 orders barring individuals from serving as officers and directors of public
corporations,8 and other equitable relief,9 including ancillary remedies, as discussed in more
detail below.10
B.

Consent Decrees and Settlements
The vast majority of SEC enforcement actions – approximately 90% – are settled, with

the SEC often simultaneously filing the complaint in federal court together with a settlement.11
The court is then asked to approve the settlement as a consent decree.12 The incentives for each
party to settle are obvious. For the resource-strapped SEC, settlement is often preferable to a

binding only upon the parties to the action . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d).

7

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(3), 15 U.S.C, § 78u(d)(3) (imposing a three-tiered penalty scheme

with penalties ranging from $50,000 to $500,000 for corporations).

8

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(2), 15 U.S.C, § 78u(d)(2) (stating that the court may prohibit any
person from serving as officer or director “if the person’s conduct demonstrates unfitness to serve as an officer or
director”).
9

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(5), 15 U.S.C, § 78u(d)(5) (authorizing the court to “grant any
equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors”).

10

See infra Part II.C.

11

See STEINBERG & FERRARA, supra note 5, at § 3:60.
I use the term “consent decree” to mean a court-approved settlement between the defendant and the SEC. As one
noted commentator has stated, a consent decree is “an agreement between the parties to end a lawsuit on mutually
acceptable terms which the judge agrees to enforce as a judgment.” See Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the
Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321, 325 (1988).
12

4

costly trial. For the defendant, settlement offers a variety of advantages.13 It is often cheaper for
a defendant to settle than to go forward with a contested case. Settlements also limit bad
publicity, especially because the SEC does not require the defendant to admit to any wrongdoing.
In addition, a defendant may feel incredible pressure from the SEC to settle, and a refusal to
settle may lead to SEC claims of lack of cooperation, which could impact the sanctions the SEC
decides to seek if the case is contested. Finally, the defendant may decide to settle to avoid the
potential collateral estoppel effects resulting from a successful SEC injunctive action. All in all,
even innocent defendants have good reasons to agree to a settlement.
Although the parties to a consent decree have by definition agreed to the injunctive relief,
the court does not automatically approve the settlement. Because an SEC consent decree has the
potential to impact the rights of third parties, the district court conducts a fairness review of the
agreement. This judicial review, however, is limited. The standard set forth in most cases is that
the court will approve the consent decree unless it is “unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable.”14 In
making this determination, the court gives substantial deference to the administrative agency’s
decision to settle the case. The limited nature of the review is perhaps understandable, given the

13

See THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL: TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 183-185 (Richard M. Phillips, ed.

1997).

14

See, e.g., SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that “[u]nless a consent decree is unfair,

inadequate, or unreasonable, it ought to be approved”).

5

strong federal policy favoring approval of consent decrees.15 Moreover, because of the nonadversarial nature of the settlement process, a court would have difficulty receiving information
tending to show that a settlement is unfair. Not surprising, courts approve most SEC consent
decrees.
C.

Ancillary Relief
In addition to seeking injunctions, the SEC also commonly seeks “ancillary relief” to

enforce the federal securities laws. The term “ancillary relief” refers to non-statutorily based
remedies that supplement an injunction. Implicit in the ancillary remedy is the assumption that
an order enjoining the defendant from future violations of federal securities laws will not be
effective, so that more direction is needed from the court to ensure that the defendant will
comply with the federal securities laws.
One commentator has observed that there are three different categories of ancillary relief:
(1) remedies intended to correct past violations of the federal securities laws, such as
disgorgement; (2) remedies intended to preserve the existing condition of the defendant during
the pendency of the action, such as an asset freeze or the appointment of a receiver; and (3)
remedies intended to discourage future violations of the federal securities laws by regulating
certain aspects of the defendant’s future behavior, such as the institution of corporate governance
changes, the judicial appointment of board members, or the appointment of special investigative

15

See, e.g., SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting the “strong federal policy favoring the approval

and enforcement of consent decrees”).

6

agents.16
This third type of ancillary relief has been the subject of robust academic debate,
beginning when the SEC first started to aggressively seek these remedies in the 1960s and
1970s.17 Commentators have pointed out that the corporate governance reforms required by the
SEC in its consent decrees can interfere with the effective management of a company.18
Similarly, court appointment of SEC-approved directors can be a significant intrusion on
shareholder suffrage, while the appointment of special investigative agents can undermine
attorney-client privilege.19 And, finally, because it is doubtful that the SEC has authority to
promulgate rules with the same far-reaching effect as the ancillary remedies ordered by a court,
the judicial grant of ancillary relief presents a real danger of SEC overreaching.20
Despite these criticisms, the SEC has sought, and has usually obtained, ancillary relief
from the courts.21 The courts have had no problems finding the authority to order these
remedies.22 Historically, courts have relied on their inherent equitable powers – as opposed a

16

See George W. Dent, Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal Remedies, 67 MINN. L. REV.
865, 869-72 (1983).
17

For a good discussion of the history of the SEC’s use of ancillary relief, see Morrissey, supra note 4, at 443-47.

18

See, e.g., James R. Farrand, Ancillary Relief in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1779, 1805 (1975)
(stating that ancillary relief has “provided a means for government control of corporate management and
decisionmaking”).
19

See, e.g., Arthur F. Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunctive Actions, 31
BUS. LAW. 1323, 1328-30 (1976) (discussing the attorney-client privilege).

20

See infra Part IV.E.

21

See Morrissey, supra note 4, at 447 (stating that “[b]y the late 1970s, ancillary relief had become a well-accepted
expansion of the Commission’s authority”).
22
As one commentator noted, “[t]he most persuasive argument for ancillary relief in federal securities law is that the
Supreme Court and many lower courts have approved such relief and that almost no judicial precedent has
questioned it.” See Dent, supra note 16, at 869.

7

grant of power under the federal securities laws – as the basis for ordering ancillary relief.
Courts have reasoned that “[o]nce the equity jurisdiction of the district court has been properly
invoked by a showing of a securities fraud violation, the court possesses the necessary power to
fashion an appropriate remedy.”23
Although the courts in the past looked to their broad equitable powers to grant ancillary
relief, courts now have statutory power to grant these remedies in SEC enforcement actions. As
part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the ‘34 Act was amended to authorize the granting of
“any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.”24 In
enacting this provision, Congress signaled its approval of the use of ancillary relief in SEC
enforcement actions.25
III. WorldCom and the Corporate Monitor

23

See SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir. 1972).

24

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(5), 15 U.S.C, § 78u(d)(5).

25

A review of the legislative history revealed only one reference to the grant of the expanded equitable powers, in a

discussion relating to disgorgement. The Senate Report states that:

The Commission has also suggested that it should be allowed to obtain additional relief in
enforcement cases. For a securities law violation, currently an individual may be ordered to
disgorge funds that he or she received “as a result of the violation.”

Rather than limiting

disgorgement to these gains, the bill will permit courts to impose any equitable relief necessary or
appropriate to protect, and mitigate harm to, investors.
See S. REP. NO. 107-205 (2002).

8

WorldCom perpetrated one of the most massive accounting frauds in United States
history. Over a period of several years, WorldCom managers improperly inflated the company’s
income by over $9 billion. After WorldCom announced that it would be restating its financial
results, the SEC brought an enforcement action against the company, contending that it violated
the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. In the complaint, the SEC sought an
injunction against further violations and sought monetary penalties. The complaint also sought
fairly typical ancillary relief, such as orders prohibiting the company from destroying any
documents and from making any extraordinary payments to WorldCom employees. In addition,
the SEC asked the court to appoint a so-called “corporate monitor.”
A.

The Evolving Judicial Authority of the Corporate Monitor
1.

The Initial Appointment of the Corporate Monitor.

On June 26, 2002, the SEC filed its initial complaint, asking the district court to appoint a
corporate monitor to “ensure compliance” with any court orders prohibiting the destruction of
evidence or the paying of excessive compensation.26 Two days later, pursuant to a stipulation

26

Specifically, the SEC requested the following relief from the court:
A.

Permanently restraining and enjoining WorldCom from violating Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder;

B.

Permanently restraining and enjoining WorldCom from violating Section 13(a) of the
Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-3 thereunder;

C.

Imposing civil monetary penalties on WorldCom pursuant to Section 21(d) of the
Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u];

9

between the SEC and WorldCom, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York ordered the appointment of a Corporate Monitor. The court did not
immediately select the Corporate Monitor, but instead directed the parties to jointly propose a
name to the court within five days.27
On July 3, 2002, the court appointed Richard C. Breeden, a former Chairman of the SEC,
to act as WorldCom’s Corporate Monitor.28 Although the appointment was not accompanied by
a written description of the selection process, a transcript from the hearing indicates that Judge
Rakoff selected Mr. Breeden from a list of three names pre-approved by the SEC and

D.

Prohibiting WorldCom and its affiliates, officers, directors, employees, and agents, from
destroying, altering, or removing from the court’s jurisdiction any documents relevant to
the matters alleged herein;

E.

Prohibiting WorldCom and its affiliates from making any extraordinary payments to any
present or former affiliate, or officer, director, or employee of WorldCom, or its affiliates,
including but not limited to any severance payments, bonus payments, or indemnification
payments;

F.

Appointing a corporate monitor to ensure compliance with Items D and E, above; and

G.

Granting such other and additional relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, Complaint, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2002). The SEC’s amended
complaint is substantially similar. See SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, First Amended Complaint, at 10
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2002).
27

See Complaint, supra note 22, at 3. According to the order, if the parties failed to agree by July 3, 2002, the court
would schedule a conference to select the Corporate Monitor. See id.
28

See SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, Memo to Civil Docket Clerk (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2002).

10

WorldCom.29
2.

The Initial Authority of the Corporate Monitor.

Initially, the WorldCom Corporate Monitor had fairly limited authority. He had two
main charges: prevent the destruction of evidence30 and prevent the payment of excessive
executive compensation.31 The court was concerned that, without court oversight, WorldCom
29

See SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, Transcript, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2002). The names of the other
two candidates were not disclosed during the hearing.
30

SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, Stipulation and Order, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2002). Pursuant to the
court order, “the Corporate Monitor shall confirm that WorldCom has implemented reasonable document retention
policies and the Corporate Monitor shall take reasonable steps to oversee compliance with those policies.” See id. at
3.
31

See id. at 2. The applicable portion of the court order reads in its entirety:
Upon appointment by the Court pursuant to this Order, the Corporate Monitor for WorldCom shall
have oversight responsibility with respect to all compensation paid by WorldCom. The intent of
the parties is that the Corporate Monitor shall exercise its oversight responsibility to prevent unjust
enrichment as a result of the conduct alleged in the Complaint and to ensure that the assets of
WorldCom are not dissipated by payments that are not necessary to the operation of the business.
For purposes of this Stipulation and Order, compensation is defined so as to include salary, as well
as any severance payment, bonus, indemnification, gift, loan, reimbursement, advance, or
consideration of any kind in excess of established salary, but does not include payments to
reimburse employees for ordinary business expenses incurred.

In exercising its oversight

responsibility, the Corporate Monitor shall have discretion to determine the type of compensation
to review and the either approve or disapprove, as well the discretion to determine the group of
officers, directors and employees with respect to which such compensation shall be reviewed and
either approved or disapproved.
Id.

11

managers would continue to receive the excessive salaries and perks that had been the norm at
the Bernie Ebbers run company. Thus, the Corporate Monitor was expressly authorized to either
approve or disapprove all compensation payments made by WorldCom.32
3.

The Expanding Judicial Authority of the Corporate Monitor.

Although the Corporate Monitor’s role may have begun as a way to ensure that
WorldCom did not continue its widely-reported practice of paying excessive compensation to its
current (and former) managers, Mr. Breeden’s authority quickly began to expand.33 First, very
early in the proceedings, the court issued an order significantly expanding the definition of
“compensation.” According to the court, compensation included not only payments made to

32

The order provides that the Corporate Monitor has the discretion to “approve or disapprove” compensation

payments. See id. It also states that if the Corporate Monitor does not promptly approve a compensation payment,
WorldCom could seek approval from the court. See id. at 3.

33

Interestingly enough, the expansion of the Corporate Monitor’s role appears to have been contemplated by the

court from the beginning. During the hearing at which Mr. Breeden was appointed as WorldCom’s Corporate
Monitor, Judge Rakoff stated that:
it may be . . . that he will have other functions to serve as time goes on. We don’t need to reach
that today, because this will be a fluid situation that will evolve with the great assistance of both
sides, and if and when it is necessary to have any discussions about the appropriateness of
broadening the monitor’s role, we will, of course, have a public discussion here in court.
See Transcript, supra note 25, at 4..

12

WorldCom executives, but also payments made to any “outside advisor” hired by WorldCom.34
For example, the Corporate Monitor was given oversight and approval authority over payments
made to WorldCom’s investment bank, restructuring advisors, and attorneys.
Shortly after WorldCom’s bankruptcy filing, Judge Rakoff reiterated the breadth of the
Corporate Monitor’s authority, stating that “[t]o put it bluntly, it is the responsibility of the
Corporate Monitor, among other responsibilities, to prevent unnecessary compensatory
expenditures by the company, not only in the form of looting by miscreants but also in the form
of excessive compensation of those who mistake a damaged company for a broken piggybank.”35
To determine what was “necessary” to WorldCom’s operations, the court reasoned that

34

As the court stated:

Lest there be any doubt as to the scope of [the Corporate Monitor’s access], it means, among much
else, that “outside advisors” hired, retained, or consulted by the defendant or by any of its officers,
directors, agents, or employees, or anyone acting in concert with any of them, to help advise the
company or its board in the current circumstances must, upon pain of contempt, make full
disclosure to the Corporate Monitor of any and all information the Corporate Monitor requests
(including, by way of example, their own compensation arrangements with the defendant and their
advice to the defendant or its Board). Among others, such advisors include, by way of example,
investment banking advisors like Goldman Sachs & Co. and outside investigators like Wilmer,
Cutler & Pickering.
SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963 Order, at 1-2 (July 15, 2002).

35

SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, Memorandum Order, at 3 (Aug. 1, 2002).

13

the Corporate Monitor needed to receive information well beyond simple compensation
arrangements. In fact, according to the court, Mr. Breeden was entitled to receive “complete
information about every aspect of the business he deems relevant to his assessments” in advance
of any company action.36 In addition, the order specifically stated that the Corporate Monitor

36

See id. at 4. Specifically, the order provided that the Corporate Monitor be provided with the following

information:
a.

any document or information communicated by the company or any professional
employed by the company to any of (I) the official committees, (ii) any debtor-inpossession (“DIP”) lender, (iii) any participant in the bank group or (iv) any other
creditor (any such person being a “Covered Party”). This includes, inter alia, financial or
other reports, projections, analyses, proposals, covenant tests, or other written (including
electronic format) material.

b.

any financial or other report, study, projection, analysis, proposal, presentation or other
document relating in any way to material business decisions or the conduct of the
bankruptcy (including any such item labeled “drafts” but nonetheless circulated)
generated by any professional employed by the company and communicated to senior
management of the company. This includes, inter alia, financial reports, restructuring
proposals, downsizing analyses, disposition alternatives, “RIF” proposals and proposals
to, or under discussion with, potential acquirors, lenders or investors.

c.

any plan, proposal or study, including conceptual issue reviews, relating to compensation
in any form, including severance and retention programs of any kind, and including,
without limitations, retentions of outside professionals or other advisors, including
restructuring, investment banking or bankruptcy professionals employed by the company.

14

had to be granted access to any employee of WorldCom “to discuss any matter deemed relevant
to the Corporate Monitor at any time”37 and had to be invited to any meetings or discussions
between WorldCom and the persons involved in its bankruptcy proceeding, including, for

d.

any document or other material distributed to any one or more members of the board of
directors (whether in that person’s capacity as a member of the board, any committee
thereof, or of management).

e.

any proposal, termsheet, agreement, letter of intent, plan, analysis or other
communication relating to (I) sale of assets or securities out of the ordinary course, (ii)
merger or consolidation of the company or any subsidiary thereof with any other person
or entity, (iii) any shutdown of service, termination of activities or abandonment of
property or assets, and/or (iv) any other business decision ultimately requiring
Bankruptcy Court approval, including any draft study or multiple scenarios for internal
review.

f.

any business plan, plan of reorganization, plan of liquidation, or proposed
recapitalization, or any draft or segment thereof (including exhibits, appendices, or
material to be incorporated therein).

g.

any cash flow reports or memoranda of any kind, including reports of all activity in the
DIP loan facilities of the company, and of any draft financial statement or revision
thereof.

h.

copies of any proposed retention agreement or motion relating thereto.

I.

copies of all filings with the Bankruptcy Court.

See id. at 4-5.
37

See id. at 5.

15

example, the official creditors committees.38 Pursuant to this authority, Mr. Breeden was entitled
to attend all WorldCom board and board committee meetings. The Corporate Monitor’s already
expansive authority would soon increase even further, as a result of WorldCom’s consent decree
with the SEC.
4.

The Effect of the Consent Decree.

In November 2002, WorldCom entered into a partial settlement with the SEC.39 As part
of the consent decree, the Corporate Monitor was required to review WorldCom’s corporate
governance40 and to issue recommendations concerning WorldCom’s future governance

38

See id. at 6.

39

See SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, Judgment of Permanent Injunction Against Defendant WorldCom,
Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2002). As part of the settlement, WorldCom agreed to be permanently enjoined from
violating the federal securities laws. This settlement did not include any judgment regarding civil penalties. The
parties later agreed that WorldCom would pay a penalty of $500 million in cash and $250 million worth of stock in
the reorganized company. See SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, Consent and Undertaking of Defendant
WorldCom, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2003).
40

Specifically, the Corporate Monitor was required to determine:
(1) whether WorldCom is complying with recognized standards of “best practices” with respect to
corporate governance;
(2) whether WorldCom has sufficient policies and safeguards in place (a) to ensure that
WorldCom’s Board of Directors and all committees of WorldCom (including without limitation
the audit committee and the compensation committee) have appropriate powers, structure,
composition, and resources and (b) to prevent self-dealing by management;
(3) whether WorldCom has an adequate and appropriate code of ethics and business conduct, and
related compliance mechanisms; and
(4) whether WorldCom has appropriate safeguards in place to prevent further violations of the

16

structure.41 In June 2003 – several months before Mr. Breeden’s report was issued – WorldCom
stipulated that it would adopt each of the Corporate Monitor’s corporate governance
recommendations in full.42
5.

The Corporate Monitor’s Report.

In August 2003, Mr. Breeden issued his well-publicized corporate governance report,
“Restoring Trust.”43 In the 115 page report, the Corporate Monitor made 78 recommendations,
including some that have been considered quite controversial.44 Many of the recommendations
sought to increase shareholder power in the corporation, such as provisions permitting

federal securities laws.
See Judgment of Permanent Injunction Against Defendant WorldCom, supra note 35,at 5-6.
41

The Judgment of Permanent Injunction also required that, following the Corporate Monitor’s report, the

WorldCom board was required to report back to the court and the SEC as to whether it would adopt the Corporate
Monitor’s recommendations. See id. at 6.

42

See SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, Stipulation and Order, at 2 (S.D.N.Y June 11, 2003). If

WorldCom later decided that it did not want to adopt one or more of the Corporate Monitor’s recommendations, the
company would have to seek relief from the court. See id.

43

See Richard C. Breeden, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO THE HON. JED S. RAKOFF UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF MCI (Aug.
2003).
44

For example, a noted corporate lawyer criticized the report, stating that many of the recommendations “have long
since been rejected by the regulators and lawmakers who have spent much time and effort considering these
matters.” See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Client Letter,“Restoring Trust” or Losing Perspective?, at 1 (Aug.
27, 2003). See also Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson Client Letter, A New Voice in the Corporate Governance
Debate: The Recommendations of WorldCom’s Corporate Monitor, at 2 (Sep. 8, 2003) (stating that many of the
recommendations were “highly controversial”).
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shareholder nomination of directors,45 establishing an “electronic town hall” for shareholder
communications,46 and requiring the company to include in its proxy statement certain
shareholder proposals,47 even if those proposals could be excluded under the SEC’s current
proxy rules. Other recommendations were intended to strengthen the performance and
effectiveness of the board of directors, including several rules relating to the composition of the
board and board committees.48 He also recommended that the board have at least one new
member each year, thus introducing board term limits.49 In addition, because the Corporate
Monitor traced many of WorldCom’s problems to its practice of paying excessive compensation
to its management, the report contained several rules addressing the amount and form of
executive compensation, including bans on the use of stock options50 and caps on annual
executive compensation.51 Not surprisingly, the report also imposed several rules aimed at
improving the accuracy and transparency of WorldCom’s financial reporting process, including

45

See Breeden, supra note 39, at 44-47.

46

See id. at 85-86.

47

48

See id.

For example, Mr. Breeden recommended that the WorldCom should ordinarily consist of ten directors. See id. at

32-33. All of these directors, other than the CEO, should be independent directors. See id. at 33-34.

49

See id. at 37-38.

50

See id. at 69.

51

See id. at 68-69.
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the adoption of dividend policy with a target payout of annual dividends of at least 25% of the
company’s annual income.52 Finally, the Corporate Monitor attempted to establish an honest
corporate culture at WorldCom through a new legal and ethics program.53
B.

The Corporate Monitor’s Activities.
The above discussion traces the history of the expanding judicial authority of

WorldCom’s Corporate Monitor, from a person initially charged with prohibiting the destruction
of evidence and the payment of excessive executive compensation to a person who was required
to revamp the company’s corporate governance structure. As explained in more detail below,
Mr. Breeden capitalized on this judicially-created authority and expanded his power even further
to become arguably the most powerful person at WorldCom, a person involved in every
important corporate decision.
These important corporate decisions included the compensation packages for the new
management team. In fact, one of Mr. Breeden’s first significant actions was the approval of the
pay package for Michael Capellas, WorldCom’s new Chief Executive Officer. Initially, the
Corporate Monitor rejected the WorldCom board’s proposed employment agreement with Mr.
Capellas, opining that it was “grossly excessive.”54 Eventually, WorldCom agreed to reduce Mr.

52

See id. at 97-98.

53

See id. at 106-111.

54

See Andrew Backover, Judge Questions Incoming WorldCom CEO’s Pay Plan, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2002.
Originally, the board proposed a compensation package that would pay Mr. Capellas $1.5 million in base salary,
plus a signing bonus of $2 million and up to $1.5 million in performance-based bonuses. He would also receive $18
million in restricted stock in the post-bankruptcy WorldCom entity. See also In re WorldCom, Inc., Ch. 11 Case
No. 02-13533 (AJG), at Exhibit A to Debtors’ Motion Pursuant to Sections 363 and 105 of the Bankruptcy Code for
an Order Authorizing the Employment of Michael D. Capellas as President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman
of the Board of Directors of the Debtors, at 2-3 & 7-8 ( Bankr. S.D.N.Y Dec. 9, 2002).
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Capellas’s compensation.55 But the Corporate Monitor was not satisfied with merely obtaining
this salary concession. Before he would approve the pay package, Mr. Breeden required Mr.
Capellas to sign an “Undertaking and Pledge,” which required Mr. Capellas to agree to numerous
corporate governance initiatives as a condition to employment.56
Given the Corporate Monitor’s judicial charge to prevent WorldCom from paying
excessive compensation, Mr. Breeden’s participation in this important corporate decision is not
surprising. But a review of Mr. Breeden’s activities at WorldCom demonstrates that his power
extended well beyond compensation decisions. In fact, the Corporate Monitor actively
participated in the general business operations of WorldCom.57 His involvement was so
significant that he has been described variously as an unofficial “company executive” and
“unofficial board member” of the company.58 In addition to attending all board meetings and

55

Under the new compensation package, Mr. Capellas received the same salary, signing bonus, and performance
based bonus. However, his restricted stock award was reduced by $6 million to $12 million. See Seth Schiesel,
Revised Contract for WorldCom’s New Chief Executive Wins Approval From 2 Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002,
at C-10. See also In re WorldCom, Inc., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-13533 (AJG), Exhibit A to Supplement to Debtors’
Motion Pursuant to Sections 363 and 105 of the Bankruptcy Code for an Order Authorizing the Employment of
Michael D. Capellas as President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Debtors, at
7-8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y Dec. 16, 2002).
56

For example, the Undertaking and Pledge required Mr. Cappellas to develop disclosure policies beyond those
required by the federal securities laws, to “support robust levels of capital investment in internal controls,” to help
develop corporate governance mechanisms that will “advance the best interests of shareholders, creditor and the
public at large,” and to help ensure that the board “has a membership that represents shareholder interests (and
stakeholder interests broadly prior to emergence from bankruptcy).” See SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963,
Order, Exhibit A at 1-2 (S.D.N.Y Dec. 16, 2002).
57

In fact, Mr. Breeden had an office at WorldCom’s headquarters, right down the hall from the company’s CEO.
See One on One With Richard Breeden, Corporate Monitor for MCI, Interview on Nightly Business Report,
transcript available at www.nbr.com/transcript/2003/transcript082603.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) (stating that
Mr. Breeden “has been sitting inside the company, two doors down from the CEO, watching everything that goes on
there”).
58

See Lublin & Young, supra note 1, at B-1 (characterizing Mr. Breeden as an “unofficial board member”).
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controlling the company’s monthly budget, Mr. Breeden was a significant player in high-level
corporate negotiations, including, for example, the negotiations which ultimately restored
WorldCom’s ability to bid on government contracts 59 and negotiations with WorldCom’s
creditors.
The Corporate Monitor also chose the new members of WorldCom’s board of directors60
and was instrumental in obtaining the resignation of a shareholder-elected member of the board
accused of a conflict of interest transaction during the Bernie Ebbers era – even after the board
refused to remove him.61
But perhaps the most significant example of the Corporate Monitor’s power at
WorldCom was the extraordinarily active role he played in the ultimate decision faced by any
corporation: the decision to be acquired by another company. During 2005, two companies –
Verizon Communications, Inc. and Qwest Communications International, Inc. – fought for
control of WorldCom, requiring the WorldCom board to choose between the two suitors. Mr.
Breeden was directly involved in the company’s negotiations with both Verizon and Qwest.62 In

59

See id. (noting that Mr. Breeden was a “key player in government negotiations that led to . . . restoration as a
federal bidder” on government contracts).
60

See Barnaby J. Feder, Five Are Chosen to Join Board of a Reorganized WorldCom, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2003, at
C2 (stating that Mr. Breeden recommended the new members of the board).
61

See Kurt Eichenwald, WorldCom Director Quits and Agrees to Pay For Using Plane, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002,

at C3 (noting that Mr. Breeden urged the board to remove the director, but the board determined that it did not have
the authority to remove a shareholder-elected director).
62

According to WorldCom’s public documents, Mr. Breeden participated in the decision to reject Qwest’s bid in
favor of Verizon. See, e.g., Letter from MCI Chairman to Qwest Chairman Dated March 1, 2005 (noting that
“MCI’s board, with the participation of the court-appointed Corporate Monitor . . ., has reviewed all options.”).
Published reports also indicate that Mr. Breeden was deeply involved in the negotiations. For example, the
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fact, the extent of his involvement led to some investor criticism that the Corporate Monitor
unduly favored Verizon over Qwest in the takeover battle, even though Qwest appeared to offer
a higher short term value to WorldCom shareholders.63
IV. Potential Dangers Presented by the Use of a Corporate Monitor
Although WorldCom is the most well-known example of a Corporate Monitor, the SEC

Washington Post reported, that “[e]very time [WorldCom] delves into delicate discussions over whether to merge
with Qwest Communications International Inc. or Verizon Communications Inc. it is doing so under the close watch
of” the Corporate Monitor. See Yuki Noguchi, The “Sheriff” of MCI, WASH. POST, April 28, 2005, at E01. See
also Jesse Drucker & Almar Latour, Qwest Weighs Proxy Fight for MCI, WALL ST. J., April 7, 2005, at A6
(reporting that MCI rejected Qwest’s bid after the Qwest CEO spoke with Mr. Breeden).
63

See, e.g., id. (stating that “some shareholders argu[ed] that [Mr. Breeden] has been biased towards Verizon’s offer

from the start”). See also Almar Latour, Verizon Regains an Edge, For Now, In Bid for MCI, WALL ST. J., April 11,
2005, at A1 (quoting a large shareholder as saying “How could [WorldCom’s] corporate monitor and board allow
this to happen?”).

In addition to Mr. Breeden’s direct influence on WorldCom’s decision to be acquired by Verizon, the
Corporate Monitor also may have had a more subtle, indirect, influence on the outcome. As part of the corporate
governance changes made by WorldCom at the direction of the Corporate Monitor, the WorldCom board adopted
certain guidelines. According to these guidelines, the WorldCom board’s role was to “maximize the long-term
value of the Company for its shareholders” by, inter alia, “addressing the concerns of other interested parties
including employees, customers, suppliers, government and regulatory officials, communities and the public at
large.” See MCI, Inc. Corporate Governance Guidelines, found at
http://www.verizonbusiness.com/about/governance/guidelines (visited February 9, 2006). By permitted the
WorldCom board to focus on long-term value and “other constituencies,” these guidelines may have helped defeat
Qwest’s bid. See also Ken Belson, Why MCI Is Turning Up Its Nose at $1.3 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, April 10, 2005, at
C.3.
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has sought this ancillary remedy in several other recent cases and is likely to use this novel
remedy again in the future.64 Therefore, it is important to consider the potential dangers
associated with the use of a Corporate Monitor.
A.

De Facto Expansion of Corporate Monitor’s Power
The appointment of a Corporate Monitor leads to the potential for a de facto expansion of

the Corporate Monitor’s power. By “de facto” expansion, I mean an expansion of the Corporate
Monitor’s powers beyond those specifically defined by the relevant court orders. The judicial
power to “monitor” or “oversee” a company’s management creates the danger of non-judicial
expansion of the Corporate Monitor’s power.
An examination of WorldCom illustrates this phenomenon. The court orders defining the
authority of the WorldCom Corporate Monitor did not expressly grant Mr. Breeden the power to
participate in the business operations of WorldCom. Nor did the orders authorize Mr. Breeden to
negotiate a merger agreement or to select the names of individuals who would serve on the new
WorldCom board. So where did these powers come from? They must have been derived from
the Corporate Monitor’s general oversight authority. Judge Rakoff wanted Mr. Breeden to be his
eyes and ears so that the court could determine whether WorldCom had changed its ways.65

64

65

See supra note 3.
As Judge Rakoff explained, “[t]he monitor’s client is a difficult, rather ornery client, namely me, and more

abstractedly, the Court, and I want a hands-on monitor. I want a monitor who will report to me what is going on
and, more importantly, feel free to look in any nook and cranny that is necessary to fulfill his functions.” See
Transcript, supra note 25, at 3.
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Presumably, if Mr. Breeden was not satisfied with what he observed, he would report back to the
court with recommendations, and the court would order WorldCom to comply with Mr.
Breeden’s recommendations. This gave Mr. Breeden tremendous leverage to increase his power
at the company beyond the scope of his defined authority, and he appeared to do so with the tacit
approval of the court.
Mr. Breeden’s de facto power also increased because WorldCom was unlikely to
challenge his role at the company. To recover from the tremendous scandal, it was vitally
important for WorldCom to convince the investing public that the company was fully committed
to reform. Any conflict with the Corporate Monitor – no matter how justified – would lead to
the conclusion that WorldCom was dragging its feet on its promise to become a good corporate
citizen. Therefore, WorldCom had to avoid any public disagreement with Mr. Breeden. This
strategic decision to accept Mr. Breeden’s active participation in WorldCom’s business permitted
the Corporate Monitor’s power to expand to levels not contemplated by the court orders. Any
corporation that agrees to accept a Corporate Monitor would be in similar position; thus, the
danger of a de facto expansion of power is inherent in the use of a Corporate Monitor.
B.

Potential Interference With Management
Similarly, the appointment of a Corporate Monitor – at least one with broad powers – can

conceivably interfere with the ability of the board and corporate officers to manage the company.
This interference might be direct, if a court defines the Corporate Monitor’s authority to trump
decisions made by the board or corporate officers. Or the interference can be indirect.
The potential for direct interference by a Corporate Monitor can be demonstrated by an
examination of the facts of WorldCom. For example, although it is the board’s role to set
24

executive compensation, the WorldCom judge placed that authority in the hands of the Corporate
Monitor. Mr. Breeden’s veto of Mr. Capellas’s compensation agreement was within his
judicially-created authority, but it impeded what is arguably the board’s most significant
responsibility, the selection of a CEO.66 Moreover, certain of his corporate governance reforms
affected the discretion of WorldCom’s officers to manage the company. For example, the ethics
pledge signed by Mr. Capellas as a condition to his employment contained several undertakings
that restricted his discretion to manage the company.67 The CEO’s discretion was also impacted
by the recommendations set forth in Mr. Breeden’s “Restoring Trust” report, which the company
agreed to adopt as part of its SEC settlement. For example, the report included a recommended
dividend policy, which required WorldCom to set a target of paying annual dividends of at least
25% of annual income. Such a cash commitment had to have affected the decisions made by
WorldCom management.
The WorldCom Corporate Monitor also had an indirect – though no less significant –
effect on management. Appointing a Corporate Monitor with broad oversight authority means
that the company’s management will be operating under close supervision. This undoubtedly
will affect the way management performs, perhaps for the better, but perhaps not. For example,
in WorldCom, the decision to sell the company was made even more difficult for the directors,
who also had to consider the opinion of the Corporate Monitor. Operating under a watchdog had
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And, in fact, Mr. Breeden’s insistence on a lower pay package for the new CEO created a real danger that this
sought-after executive might take a different offer. See Andrew Backover, Overseer Confident WorldCom Will
Come Back, USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 2002, at 2 (noting that Breeden’s veto “irked some creditors who wanted a new
CEO as fast as possible”).
67

See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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to have especially difficult for the CEO. As one WorldCom board member stated, Mr. Capellas
“has sort of been playing with one hand tied behind his back.”68 The danger that a Corporate
Monitor will interfere with the management, then, necessarily accompanies the appointment of a
Corporate Monitor.
C.

Accountability
A related concern is the accountability of the Corporate Monitor. Although a Corporate

Monitor effectively may be managing a corporation, he is a court officer, answerable only to the
court.69 The Corporate Monitor is not an agent of the shareholders; he is an agent of the court.
The Corporate Monitor’s primary responsibility is not to increase shareholder value, or even
necessarily to benefit shareholders. His primary responsibility is to further the court’s order.
The Corporate Monitor’s allegiance to the court raises several obvious issues, which can
be demonstrated by WorldCom. As discussed above,70 Mr. Breeden’s initial responsibility was
to prevent the destruction of evidence and to preserve corporate assets by prohibiting excessive
68

69

See Lublin & Young, supra note 1, at B-1.
For example, in WorldCom, the judge clarified the Corporate Monitor’s status as follows:
The Corporate Monitor, Richard C. Breeden, is an agent of this Court with such oversight
responsibilities as set forth in the Court’s Order . . . and as the parties may otherwise agree or the
Court may otherwise direct. The Corporate Monitor is not an officer, director, employee, or agent
of WorldCom and shall not owe any fiduciary duties or other duties or obligations of any kind to
WorldCom or WorldCom’s directors, officers, employees, shareholders, bondholders or creditor,
or any person or entity other than this Court.

See SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, Stipulation and Order, at 1-2 (S.D.N.Y July 17, 2002).
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compensation. Eventually, his primary responsibility shifted to overhaul WorldCom’s corporate
governance scheme to prevent future fraud. The prevention of securities fraud is an extremely
important goal, and WorldCom shareholders were undoubtedly benefited by Mr. Breeden’s
reforms. However, a corporation’s goals are much broader than this. The primary goals of most
corporations include financial goals, such as increasing sales, or decreasing expenses, or
improving market share. To the extent that a Corporate Monitor is charged with focusing
primarily on one goal – the prevention of securities fraud – other important goals might be
neglected to the detriment of the corporation and its shareholders.71 Put simply, the idea that a
court-appointed individual could be managing a public corporation for long periods of time
without any accountability to the shareholders is troubling, to say the least.
D.

Effect on Absent Shareholders
The concern that the Corporate Monitor is accountable only to the court is exacerbated by

the fact that the corporation’s shareholders have no input into the decision to appoint a Corporate
Monitor, and are not necessarily even aware that a Corporate Monitor is being considered by the

70

71

See supra Part III.A.2.
The argument that WorldCom’s management could have sought judicial relief if it believed that the Corporate

Monitor’s actions were harming the corporation is not very persuasive. Even if the judge agreed, the judge would be
forced to balance the goal of preventing securities fraud against other corporate goals. Balancing corporate goals is
a difficult task, and a single judge would presumably be no better at it than the Corporate Monitor. Indeed, the
recognition that these kinds of business decisions are best left to a corporate board is one of the foundations of the
business judgment rule.
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court. As discussed above,72 novel ancillary remedies are typically imposed as part of a consent
decree between the SEC and the corporation. These two parties to the agreement will have every
incentive to articulate the advantages of the appointment of a Corporate Monitor, and no
incentive to brief the court on the possible disadvantages. Although the interests of shareholders
are significantly affected by the appointment of Corporate Monitor, who may in effect be
managing the corporation, no one represents their interests to the court. Nor will the
shareholders represent themselves. Due to collective action problems and rational apathy issues
present in most large corporations, shareholders have little incentive to appear in court to discuss
the advantages or disadvantages of a Corporate Monitor.73
Similarly, absent shareholders ultimately bear the costs of the Corporate Monitor. These
costs may be substantial,74 yet there is no real mechanism in place to control costs.75 The district
court, which sets the terms of the Corporate Monitor’s engagement, has the power to disallow
unnecessary or unreasonable Corporate Monitor bills, but would that ever really occur? It is
doubtful that the corporation – which is seeking to rehabilitate its public image – would
72

See supra Part II.C.

73

In fact, shareholders seeking to be heard might not be permitted to intervene in the SEC enforcement action.
Several courts have interpreted Section 21(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to bar intervention absent SEC
consent. See, e.g., SEC v. Wozniak, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1241, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1993) (stating that “[o]nly
SEC’s consent can open a door in [the] wall to permit a private party . . . to have access to the federal court”).
74

For example, WorldCom agreed to pay Mr. Breeden his regular rate of $800 per hour, as well as to pay for
appropriate staff and advisors. See Transcript, supra note 25, at 3. Mr. Breeden’s bills were not made public, but
according to estimates, he submitted bills of $300,000 per month. See Jonathan D. Glater, In Scandals, Another
High Price to Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at C-1. Published reports indicate he was paid more than $2 million
for his work as WorldCom’s Corporate Monitor. See Lublin & Young, supra note 1, at B-1.
75

Of course, if the company has sought the protection of the bankruptcy laws, the bankruptcy court may seek to
control the Corporate Monitor’s bills, especially because there may be other constituencies – i.e., company creditors
– who may have incentive to object to significant expenses incurred by the debtor company. However, this
supervision by bankruptcy court may lead to other difficulties. See infra Part IV.H.
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challenge the Corporate Monitor’s bills. The only group that would have reason to seek to
control spending is the absent shareholders, but they do not have a voice in the SEC proceeding.
E.

Potential SEC Overreaching
One of the primary responsibilities of the SEC is to enforce the federal securities laws,

including the anti-fraud provisions. Obtaining the appointment of a Corporate Monitor who is
charged with preventing the destruction of evidence will obviously assist the SEC in its
enforcement mission. In addition, improving a company’s corporate governance could help
prevent securities fraud, also assisting the SEC in its enforcement mission. However, a
Corporate Monitor who is empowered to overhaul a company’s governance structure also
presents a danger of potential overreaching by the SEC.76 As the SEC more directly regulates
corporate governance, it moves into areas traditionally regulated by state corporate law, raising
significant federalism issues.
The federal securities laws have long been seen as disclosure statutes, while state
corporate law has been viewed as governing the internal affairs of companies. Recently, this
absolute distinction has changed, as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 provided the SEC with
limited power to regulate the internal affairs of public companies.77 However, nothing in SOX,
or any other provision of the federal securities laws, provides the SEC with overarching power to
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Possible overreaching by the SEC is not a new concern. As Professor Roberta Karmel has persuasively argued,
“[t]he Securities and Exchange Commission . . . has aspired to regulate corporate governance since its inception and,
from time to time, has exploited scandals in the public securities markets to achieve this purpose.” See Roberta S.
Karmel, The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79,
80 (2005).
77

For example, under SOX, the SEC was empowered to promulgate rules directing the national securities exchanges
to amend their listing standards to require independent audit committees. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C.
§ 778j-1.

29

regulate corporate governance. It is doubtful, for example, that the SEC would be able to
promulgate rules requiring shareholder nomination of directors78 or rules placing caps on
executive compensation.79 However, that is exactly what the Corporate Monitor did in
WorldCom, which raises the concern of SEC overreaching.
Choosing the ancillary remedy of a Corporate Monitor to advance SEC initiatives may
also run afoul of basic procedural protections provided by federal administrative law.
Ordinarily, administrative agencies, including the SEC, use the rulemaking process to implement
the relevant federal statutes.80 According to the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”),81
rules can be promulgated only after a statutorily-mandated notice and comment period.82 Using
a Corporate Monitor to further SEC policy could be viewed as an “end run” around the notice
and comment requirements of the APA.83
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For example, the SEC was unable to promulgate rules that would have required shareholder nominations of
directors. See Phyllis Plitch, SEC Is Stymied on a Final Rule for Shareholder Access to Ballot, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11,
2004, at C3.
79

Historically, the SEC has sought to regulate executive compensation, but has done so through disclosure rules.
Recently, for example, the SEC proposed rules that would require additional disclosure of compensation. See
Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, SEC Release No. 34-53185 (Jan. 27, 2006).
80

Commentators have noted that the SEC has attempted to articulate policy outside of the rulemaking process,
through enforcement decisions and through no-action letters. See, e.g., ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY
PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA; Donna M. Nagy,
Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed
Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921 (1998).
81

5 U.S.C. §§ 551-583.

82

See id. at § 553.
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According to the APA, after the agency has published notice of a proposed rule in the Federal Register, “the
agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written
data, views, or arguments.” See id. at § 553(c). The agency is required to consider any comments before adopting
the final rule. See id. Commentators have identified several advantages of this process, including the production of
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The SEC might argue that concerns of agency overreaching are unfounded. After all,
how could the SEC be criticized for actions instituted by a judicially-approved Corporate
Monitor, not by the SEC itself? However, this argument is not persuasive for several reasons.
First, as discussed below,84 the SEC plays, and will undoubtedly always play, a significant role
in selecting the Corporate Monitor, which puts the SEC in a privileged position to appoint
persons who will further agency policies. Second, although this is a relatively new ancillary
remedy, most Corporate Monitors thus far have been individuals with close ties to the SEC, such
as former senior staff or former Commissioners. And, finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
scope of the Corporate Monitor’s work will be defined by the terms of a consent decree between
the defendant corporation and the SEC. In WorldCom, for example, the SEC settlement
authorized the Corporate Monitor to overhaul WorldCom’s corporate governance,85 which
suggests that the SEC was seeking to regulate WorldCom’s corporate governance through the
use of the Corporate Monitor.
The SEC might also argue that one case does not by itself establish overreaching. While
that is true, it can set a precedent for future appointments of Corporate Monitors with similarly
far-reaching powers. And, in fact, the SEC may not even have to seek a Corporate Monitor in
order to obtain concessions from companies in enforcement proceedings. The simple threat of a
Corporate Monitor could be enough to encourage a company to agree to corporate governance

better rules, “enhanced political accountability,” and fairness. See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., I ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE 368-74 (4th ed).
84

See infra Part IV.F.

85

See supra Part III.A.5.
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changes as part of its settlement with the SEC. In fact, as discussed below,86 that has happened
at least once already.
F.

SEC Influence in Selection of Corporate Monitor
Closely related to the danger of SEC overreaching is the SEC’s influence over the

selection of the Corporate Monitor. It is the court’s responsibility to select the Corporate
Monitor, but the court will almost certainly look to the SEC for guidance. There are numerous
advantages arising from the SEC’s involvement, including the fact that the agency is wellpositioned to identify what is probably a small pool of potential candidates for the job. But with
those advantages also come some concerns. The candidates suggested by the SEC are likely to
have close ties to the agency, and thus might have an unconscious enforcement bias. As
discussed above,87 the SEC might see the appointment of a Corporate Monitor as an opportunity
to pursue broader agency initiatives and will therefore likely suggest individuals who share those
beliefs. Moreover, the Corporate Monitor might have his own reasons to advance the SEC’s
agenda. Being selected as a Corporate Monitor can be a lucrative job.88 An individual who
serves as a Corporate Monitor will understand that he needs to keep the SEC satisfied if he
would like to see his name on an SEC “short list” for a Corporate Monitor position in the future.
Thus, although it is natural for the court to rely on SEC for assistance in the selection process,
the court needs to recognize that the SEC may recommend candidates who see themselves as
answerable to the SEC, as opposed to the court.
86

See infra Part IV.G.

87

See supra Part IV.E.

88

See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
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G.

Conflict with State Corporate Law
As the scope of the Corporate Monitor’s power expands, either by court order or not,

there is a greater potential that his participation will interfere with the statutory scheme
contemplated by state corporate law statutes, which naturally leads to the question of whether a
Corporate Monitor is legal under state corporate law. Although the Supremacy Clause would
permit a federal district court to order an ancillary remedy that would cause a company to violate
its law of incorporation,89 such an order would raise significant federalism concerns.
Several arguments can be made that a Corporate Monitor with far-reaching powers is
illegal under state corporate law. First, if a Corporate Monitor can veto board decisions, there is
an obvious clash with state corporate statutes that vest the management of a corporation with the
board of directors.90 Similarly, if a board agrees to the appointment of a Corporate Monitor, the
board might be seen as impermissibly delegating its powers.91 In addition, to the extent that the
Corporate Monitor is able to overrule decisions of a board, shareholders are deprived of their
statutory right to elect the individuals who are supposed to manage the corporation.92 The
shareholder franchise can also be affected if the Corporate Monitor chooses interim directors or

89

See U.S. CONST. art VI, ¶ 2 (stating that “the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land”).
90

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (stating that “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors”).
91

See RODMAN WARD, JR. ET AL, 1 FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 141.1.3 (4th ed.)
(stating that “the board may not either formally or effectively abdicate its statutory power and its fiduciary duty to
manage or direct the management of the business and affairs of the corporation”).
92

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 211(b)(stating that “an annual meeting of stockholders shall be held for the
election of directors”).
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forces shareholder-elected directors to resign from the board.
Because the Corporate Monitor is relatively new remedy that has been ordered in very
few cases, it is not surprising that the courts have not yet had to grapple with its legality.
However, two courts – a federal district court93 and the Delaware Chancery Court94 – have
recently touched upon the issue in related actions. Both cases involve the battle between
business tycoon Conrad Black and the independent directors of Hollinger International, Inc.
(“International”), a public company indirectly controlled by Black. International was accused of
making certain unauthorized payments to Black and later lying about these payments in public
documents filed with the SEC. Following these accusations, the International board created a
Special Committee to investigate Black. When Black’s misconduct was disclosed, the SEC
brought an enforcement action against International, which ultimately entered into a consent
decree with the SEC. As part of the settlement, International agreed to permit the Special
Committee to continue its investigation into Black. To help effectuate this promise, International
also consented to a “springing Corporate Monitor” provision, which provided that, upon certain
triggering events, a “Special Monitor” would be appointed by the court “to protect the interests
of the non-controlling shareholders” of International.95 These triggering events included actions
by Black that might hinder the Special Committee’s investigation, such as the removal of any
International director or the election of any new International director without the approval of
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SEC v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9097 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2004).
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Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1002 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d, 872 A.2d 559 (Del. Sup. Ct. 2005).

95

The Special Monitor was a familiar name – Richard Breeden, who was also acting as a special advisor to
International’s Special Committee.
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80% of the incumbent board.
In an emergency proceeding, a district court judge approved the consent decree.96
Several days later, Black intervened in the SEC’s enforcement action, seeking to have the
Corporate Monitor provision vacated. He argued that the consent decree impaired his right to
remove and elect corporate directors. The district court initially agreed, vacating the Corporate
Monitor provision, primarily because the SEC had not given notice to Black of the emergency
proceeding. In reaching this decision, the court was careful not to determine whether the
Corporate Monitor provision violated state corporate law. It stated that “[a]lthough [Black] has
shown [his] voting rights, as protected under Delaware law, could be impaired, the Court, at this
time, does not make a finding that the [consent decree] is in contravention of Delaware
Corporate law . . .”97 The court then stayed its order to permit the parties to fully brief the
issue.98
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SEC v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3240 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2004), vacated by SEC v. Hollinger
Int’l, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9097 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2004).
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See id. at *24.
After the rehearing, the district court ultimately decided to deny Black’s motion to vacate the consent decree,

relying on the related Chancery Court decision discussed below. The district court held that collateral estoppel
precluded Black from re-litigating the legality of the consent decree. According to the district court:
while the Delaware court did not actually address whether the Consent Judgment was properly
entered, the validity of the Consent Judgment, as it operated with the Rights Plan, was actually
litigated and essential to the court’s decision that International did not violate Delaware law in
enacting the Rights Plan and the Consent Judgment.
See SEC v. Hollinger International, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9097, *14 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2004).
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At the same time the district court was hearing the SEC enforcement action, the Delaware
Chancery Court was being asked to decide, among other things, whether Black had breached his
fiduciary duties to International.99 In response, Black argued that a poison pill plan adopted by
the International board, when combined with the springing Corporate Monitor provision, was
illegal because it violated the Blasius compelling justification standard of review.100 This
argument required the court to discuss the Corporate Monitor provision. Although Vice
Chancellor Strine did not directly rule on the legality of the remedy,101 his observations are
instructive. He focused on three factors. First, he pointed out that the Corporate Monitor
provision was narrowly drafted, noting that it was “tailored to protect the Special Committee
process.”102 Second, he observed that the Corporate Monitor did not have unilateral veto power.
According to the court, the consent decree required the Corporate Monitor to go to district court
“in order to stop what he perceived as wrongful actions” by Black.103 And, finally, he noted that
the Corporate Monitor provision was of “limited duration,” lasting only until International’s
Special Committee had completed its work.104
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See Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1002 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d, 872 A.2d 559 (Del. Sup. Ct. 2005).
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In Blasius, the Delaware Chancery Court adopted a heightened standard of review for board action that is taken
for the primary purpose of interfering with or impeding with the effectiveness of a shareholder vote. See Blasius
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch.1988). If a court determines that the Blasius standard of review
should be applied, the board’s action will be struck down unless the board can show a compelling justification,
which is an extremely difficult, if not impossible, task.
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As the Chancery Court noted, there was no direct challenge to the consent decree before it. See Hollinger, 844
A.2d at 1052 n.63.
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See id. at 1089.
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See id.
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See id.
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Vice Chancellor Strine’s approach to the issue indicates that the legality of the position of
Corporate Monitor turns on the grant of authority from the district court. Using the factors he
identified in the Hollinger opinion, the appointment of Corporate Monitor with far-reaching
powers is arguably in violation of Delaware corporate law. This conclusion can be seen by
applying the Hollinger factors to the WorldCom Corporate Monitor. First, the authority of
WorldCom’s Corporate Monitor was not narrowly drafted. Although the judicial grant of
authority to the Corporate Monitor was initially tailored supplement the injunction against the
destruction of evidence and the payment of excessive executive compensation,105 Mr. Breeden’s
authority expanded dramatically to the point where he was re-writing the company’s corporate
governance provisions106 and was participating in important business decisions.107 With this
kind of authority, it would be difficult to say that the WorldCom Corporate Monitor’s authority
was narrowly tailored.
Moreover, unlike the springing Corporate Monitor provision in the Hollinger case, in
WorldCom, the Corporate Monitor did have veto power over certain business decisions at
WorldCom. The court order expressly stated that all compensation decisions at WorldCom had
to be approved in advance by Mr. Breeden.108 Thus, unlike the Hollinger case, in WorldCom,
the Corporate Monitor did not have to seek out court approval if he believed that the company
was violating the terms of the court order.
Finally, the Corporate Monitor in WorldCom was not appointed for a limited term.
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See supra Part III.A.2.
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See supra Part III.A.5.
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See supra Part III.B.
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Rather, the term was quite indefinite. According to the applicable court order, “[t]he term of the
Corporate Monitor will cease no later than the date on which the Commission’s investigation of
this matter concludes, the Court determines the function of the Corporate Monitor is no longer
necessary, or the parties so agree.”109 In fact, Mr. Breeden continued as Corporate Monitor even
after WorldCom settled with the SEC, after WorldCom adopted Mr. Breeden’s corporate
governance proposals, and even after the company emerged from bankruptcy. It was only after
WorldCom was acquired by Verizon that the Corporate Monitor position was terminated,110
approximately two and a half years after his appointment.
Thus, the answer to the question of whether the appointment of a Corporate Monitor is
legal under state corporate law is, as so many answers are, “it depends.” The Chancery Court
decision suggests that it depends on the power exercised by the Corporate Monitor.
H.

Potential Conflicts with the Bankruptcy Court
If a corporation with a court-appointed Corporate Monitor has declared bankruptcy,111

there is the potential for conflict between the Corporate Monitor or the federal district court, on
one hand, and the bankruptcy court or the bankruptcy trustee on the other. The potential for
conflict arises because a company operating during bankruptcy does so under the supervision of
108
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See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
See Stipulation and Order, supra note 26, at 3-4.
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See SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, Order, at 1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2005). If WorldCom had not been
acquired, Mr. Breeden would probably be winding up his position right about now. See Lublin & Young, supra note
1, at B-1 (quoting Judge Rakoff as stating that Mr. Breeden would probably continue as WorldCom’s Corporate
Monitor for “another two years or so.”).
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the bankruptcy court. Two judges will therefore be supervising the company’s operations, which
raises several questions. What would happen if the district court in an SEC enforcement
proceeding authorized certain payments by the company, but the bankruptcy judge disallowed
them under bankruptcy law? Or what would happen if the bankruptcy court permitted the debtor
to make certain payments, but the Corporate Monitor, backed by the federal district court, would
not approve them?112 This conflict could have easily arisen in WorldCom if, for example, the
district court approved Mr. Breeden’s fees as Corporate Monitor but the bankruptcy judge
determined that these fees were not allowed under the Bankruptcy Code.113 Fortunately, in
WorldCom, the federal district court judge and the bankruptcy judge apparently worked well
together, so that these issues did not arise.114 However, there is no guarantee that judges in
future cases would be in agreement on such issues. A disagreement between the two courts
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This is a realistic possibility. Companies that engage in securities fraud may be forced to seek the protections of
bankruptcy law as their true financial condition is revealed. That certainly occurred with companies such as
WorldCom, Enron, and Adelphia, each of which declared bankruptcy after the accounting fraud was uncovered.
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In WorldCom, the district court judge actually recognized this danger. After WorldCom declared bankruptcy, the
district court judge entered an order clarifying the authority of the Corporate Monitor. In that order, Judge Rakoff
noted that “[t]he fact that all compensation arrangements must be approved in advance by the Corporate Monitor
does not eliminate the requirement that some or all of these expenditures may also need to be approved by the
Bankruptcy Court, in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code.” See Memorandum Order, supra note 31, at 3.
However, he raised the specter of a conflict by cautioning that “[w]hat is ‘normal’ for a company in bankruptcy
reorganization may not necessarily be permissible for a company that stands accused of fraud.” See id. at 3-4.
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Under the Bankruptcy Code, the company may pay “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services
rendered.” Bankruptcy Code § 330(a)(1).
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Apparently, one near conflict did occur in WorldCom, when several firms that had provided advice in connection
with WorldCom’s bankruptcy case submitted bills to the bankruptcy court. These submissions were made in
conformity with the Bankruptcy Code, but had not been previously approved by the Corporate Monitor as required
by a budgeting order issued by the district court. When this came to the attention of the district court judge, he
issued an order barring WorldCom from paying any of these fees, but indicated he might grant relief from the
budgeting order and recommended that the firms submit applications for relief to the court. The district court judge
directed the Corporate Monitor to review the applications and make recommendations as to whether the firms
should be paid. SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, Order, at 3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2004).
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would raise significant jurisdictional issues that are beyond the scope of this article.
V. Recommendations
As demonstrated above, the use of the Corporate Monitor raises several significant
concerns. However, this article does not recommend prohibiting the remedy altogether. If used
correctly, and in a limited fashion, the Corporate Monitor can be an extremely effective remedy
that helps the SEC in its enforcement mission.115 Thus, this article argues for restraint, both from
the SEC in seeking this remedy and from the courts in granting this remedy.
A.

SEC Should Exercise Restraint in Seeking a Corporate Monitor
The concerns addressed above suggest that the SEC should exercise restraint in seeking

the appointment of a Corporate Monitor. Indeed, it appears that the SEC is reserving this
ancillary remedy only for extreme cases of securities fraud. A high-ranking SEC official stated
that the SEC will consider a Corporate Monitor “in unusual circumstances where management
has demonstrated it can’t be trusted to act in the best interests of the investors.”116
Given the implications of the Corporate Monitor, the SEC’s caution in seeking the
115

In addition, the appointment of a Corporate Monitor may offer other advantages. Professor James Fanto has
recently proposed that the SEC should be empowered to appoint a “corporate governance monitor” for certain public
companies, who would have a role similar to that of the bank examiner. See James A. Fanto, Paternalistic
Regulation of Public Company Management: Lessons from Bank Regulation, at 4 (draft of Jan. 4, 2006) (available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=873667). Professor Fanto argues that the presence of an independent monitor will
help break down certain psychological impediments preventing the effective supervision of corporate management.
See id. at 41-44. In addition, according to Professor Fanto, it will have the advantage of “bringing into the open the
paternalistic regulation that is already occurring through the SEC’s enhanced powers over public firm management
and the increasing criminalization of management behavior, and of balancing this enforcement with guidance so that
SEC regulation does not just punish firm executives without offering them any accompanying benefits.” See id. at
4-5.
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See Sue Reisinger, Corporate Monitors Catching On, NAT’L LAW J., Oct. 4, 2004, at 8 (quoting Peter Bresnan,

who was then the Associate Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division).
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remedy is appropriate, and should be commended. However, the SEC needs to provide more
guidance as to when “unusual circumstances” are present and as to when the SEC would
conclude that company management “can’t be trusted to act in the best interests of the investors.”
Since securities fraud is allegedly involved in many enforcement cases, “unusual circumstances”
must mean something more than ordinary corporate misconduct or disclosure violations. Does
“unusual circumstances” mean situations where the management is suspected of obstructing
justice? On the other hand, several of the Corporate Monitor cases involved allegations that
management was stealing from the corporation, either by paying excessive salaries or by outright
misappropriation of funds. Does this amount to an “unusual circumstance” that would result in
the SEC’s decision to seek this ancillary relief? Or does the SEC have other situations in mind
as well?
Similarly, when can it be said that company management can no longer be trusted to act
in the “best interests of investors?” Once again, the SEC must be envisioning behavior that
consists of more than just corporate misconduct or disclosure violations; otherwise, the SEC
could conceivably seek a Corporate Monitor in virtually every enforcement action. In several of
the Corporate Monitor cases, managers were also accused of criminal violations of the securities
laws. Obviously, criminal conduct will make it more difficult to trust managers to act in the
“best interests of investors,” but does this mean that the SEC believes that corporate managers
cannot be trusted only if their conduct is so egregious as to lead to a criminal investigation? If
something less than a knowing or intentional violation of the federal securities laws will lead to
this determination, what kinds of behavior will lead the SEC to seek a Corporate Monitor? Is the
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SEC looking for a long-standing pattern of securities fraud, so that there is real concern that the
company will continue to violate the securities laws? If that is the case, what would be the effect
of replacing the wrongdoers? A company that has cleaned house can be trusted to act in the
“best interests of investors,” which suggests that the SEC should not seek a Corporate Monitor in
this situation.
Thus, although SEC representatives have publicly stated that the SEC will exercise
restraint in seeking this remedy, additional guidance concerning the SEC’s decision making
process would be helpful.117 Published guidance will assist those companies under SEC
investigation to make informed litigation decisions, including the decision to consent to a
Corporate Monitor or to other novel ancillary remedies. More importantly, published guidance
will help ensure that the SEC continues to exercise restraint in seeking a Corporate Monitor,
reducing the danger of SEC overreaching. Written guidance that limits the SEC’s discretion will
reinforce the extraordinary nature of the remedy. In addition, before seeking the remedy, the
staff will have to ascertain that the enforcement guidelines set forth by the SEC have been met.
B.

Courts Should Appoint Corporate Monitor Only in Rare Cases
In the past, the district court’s power to order novel ancillary remedies had been

questioned. Following Sarbanes-Oxley, the court’s power to appoint an independent director, or
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There is precedent for the publication of factors impacting SEC enforcement decisions. In the well-known
Seaboard Release, the SEC set forth the criteria it uses in determining “whether, and how much, to credit selfpolicing, self-reporting, remediation and cooperation” in its decision to bring enforcement actions. See Report of
Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the
Relationship to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Release No. 34-44969 (Oct. 23, 2001). More recently, the SEC
published the factors it will consider in its decision to impose penalties against corporations. See Statement of the
Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties, Press Release No. 2006-4 (Jan. 4, 2006).
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a special investigator, or, indeed, a Corporate Monitor, is established.118 The only limitation on
the court’s power – that the relief must be “appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors”
– is not much of a limitation at all. But just because a court has the power to appoint a Corporate
Monitor doesn’t mean it should. As the above discussion demonstrates, appointing a Corporate
Monitor raises several significant concerns. In recognition of these concerns, courts should
exercise self-restraint when deciding whether to appoint a Corporate Monitor.
To help ensure that this ancillary remedy is used only in rare cases, courts should
articulate clear judicial standards119 that must be met before a Corporate Monitor is appointed.
The court should begin with a presumption that an injunction is ordinarily sufficient to enforce
the federal securities laws. To obtain a Corporate Monitor, the SEC should be required to
demonstrate to the court that the injunction is not sufficient to ensure compliance, that there is
reason to doubt that the corporation will comply with the injunction. The court should weigh
this danger against the concerns expressed above, and especially the dangers that: (1) a
Corporate Monitor can significantly interfere with the effective management of a company; (2) a
Corporate Monitor is accountable only to the court, to the possible detriment of absent
shareholders; (3) a Corporate Monitor can lead to potential overreaching by the SEC; and (4) a
118
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See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
There is a long history of courts creating rules to limit their equitable powers. The most obvious example is the

injunction. Before ordering an injunction, courts ordinarily must find that the moving party would suffer irreparable
harm without it. In addition, courts have articulated exacting standards that the SEC must meet before the court will
order a receivership. See James R. Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1779, 1784-86 (1979).
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Corporate Monitor might conflict with state corporate law. The court should order a Corporate
Monitor only if it finds that the danger of non-compliance outweighs these concerns.120
Second, if a court decides to appoint a Corporate Monitor, it should issue a written order
demonstrating that this discretion-limiting balancing test has been met. It is worth noting, for
example, that in WorldCom, there was no written discussion of why Judge Rakoff decided to
order the novel remedy. This lack of scrutiny contrasts sharply with the thorough and thoughtful
analysis in the court’s decision to approve the penalty in the WorldCom case. In a 14 page
opinion and order,121 the court assessed whether the penalty would be in the public interest, and
whether the settlement was “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”
The court should give similar attention to its choice of Corporate Monitor. As discussed
above,122 the SEC may exert too much influence on the selection process. This concern argues
for a transparent selection process. To ensure transparency, the court should disclose the names
of the potential Corporate Monitors, as well as their resumes.123 Any ties to the SEC should be
fully disclosed, including whether the SEC has recommended the candidate for any other court-
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The need for clear judicial standards is especially important because it is unlikely that an order to appoint a
Corporate Monitor will be reviewed by an appellate court. If the SEC obtains the appointment of Corporate Monitor
through a consent decree, there will be no appeal. In the unlikely event that the Corporate Monitor is appointed in a
contested case, the company will have to wait until the case has been heard and the judgment is final before it can
appeal the order, meaning that the Corporate Monitor will be overseeing the company during the pendency of the
enforcement action. Even if the order is ultimately appealed, the order will be reviewed under the forgiving abuse of
discretion standard, which will be difficult for the company to overcome.
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See SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, Opinion and Order (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2003).
See supra Part IV.A.F.
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The appointment of a Corporate Monitor raises other disclosure issues, as well. Specifically, a public company
must make adequate disclosure of the Corporate Monitor in its public reports. Such disclosure should accurately
present the breadth of the Corporate Monitor’s authority and describe his influence on the company’s management.
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appointed position. The financial terms of the engagement of the Corporate Monitor should also
be made public. The court should explain his choice of Corporate Monitor in reasonable
detail.124
Most importantly, the court should carefully define the scope of the Corporate Monitor’s
duties. Any expansion of the Corporate Monitor’s duties should be justified on the record. One
of the most troubling aspects of the WorldCom Corporate Monitor was the de facto expansion of
his power. Courts should be sensitive to this concern. Similarly, the duration of the Corporate
Monitor’s appointment should be limited to a defined term. Given the concerns addressed
above, courts should be hesitant to permit a Corporate Monitor to exercise broad oversight of a
company for an unlimited amount of time.
VI. Conclusion
Enforcing the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws is an extremely difficult
task, and the SEC needs to have effective weapons in its arsenal to deter corporate misconduct
and protect investors. As demonstrated by the Corporate Monitor’s role in WorldCom, the
appointment of a Corporate Monitor can be an effective weapon for the SEC. However, there
are significant dangers inherent in its use, which suggest that the SEC should seek a Corporate
Monitor only in rare cases. In addition, in recognition of these dangers, courts should develop
standards limiting their judicial discretion to order this extraordinary remedy. After all, as Mr.
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The transparency of the selection process in WorldCom could have been better. Although there was a public
hearing, there is very little information available about the actual selection process, except that Mr. Breeden was
chosen by the court from a list of three names jointly provided by the SEC and the company. The transcript reveals
very little of the court’s deliberative process. The applicable part of the transcript consists of three short paragraphs,
noting (1) Mr. Breeden’s experience as former Chairman of the SEC and as head of company specializing in
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Breeden’s quote at the beginning of this article notes, it is an unusual role where a judiciallyappointed officer has veto power over the audit committee chairman and the CEO, and it should
stay that way.

corporate turnarounds; (2) that he is a lawyer; and (3) that he owned 6,000 shares of WorldCom stock that he
pledged to divest as soon as possible. See Transcript, supra note 25, at 2-3.
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